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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK B. AND JOANNA M. ZITO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES, 
Defendants. 
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
CRAIG & KYLIE REAGAN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 1 
CaseNo.20010715-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Reagans 
and Rule 54(b) Determination was filed August 6, 2001. Reagans filed their Notice of 
Appeal on August 29, 2001. The appeal was timely. Utah R. App. P. 22(a). Jurisdiction 
was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001), 
because the appeal is one over which the Court of Appeals does not have original 
jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court transferred to Case to the Court of Appeals, as 
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). (Record 227.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were a statute and ordinance regulating the division of land "for the purpose'1 
of development violated if the undisputed primary purpose for the division was other than 
development although there was a minor, non-motivating possibility of future building on 
the divided land? 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law 
to the prevailing party, the appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Ward v. Richfield City, 798 
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
2. Was summary judgment precluded by a genuine question of fact as to whether 
a landowner' s purpose in splitting his property was for purpose of future development, where 
the landowner repeatedly testified that his purpose was to take advantage of the lower 
interest rates that would result from such a splitting? 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact, the appellate court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the 
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light most favorable to the losing party. Hamblin v. Citv of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133,1135 
(Utah 1990). 
3. Was summary judgment of rescission precluded by a factual dispute as to 
whether the buyer could restore the property to the seller in the same condition as received? 
Review is for correctness. Id 
4. Does a zoning violation which may limit the use to which property may be put 
but which does not completely destroy the value of the property constitutes an encumbrance 
warranted against by a warranty deed. 
Review is for correctness. Ward, supra. 
5. Does a zoning violation which may limit the use to which property may be put 
but which does not completely destroy the value of the property violates the covenant of 
good right to convey implicit in a warranty deed. 
Review is for correctness. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Copies of the relevant ordinances and statutes are attached in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action for 
rescission of a real estate conveyance. 
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B. Course of proceedings and disposition below. 
Zitos filed their complaint against Cendant on April 19, 1999. (Record 18-1.1) 
Cendant filed a third-party complaint against Reagans on December 2, 1999. (Record 27-
26.) The action between Zitos and Cendant was settled and dismissed with prejudice by 
order entered July 26,2000. (Record 39.) 
Cendant moved for summary judgment against Reagans on May 16,2001. (Record 
54-53.) Oral arguments on the motion were held July 18, 2001, and the court granted the 
motion.2 (Record 197.) The formal Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment against the Reagans and Rule 54(b) Determination was filed August 6, 2001. 
(Record 201 -199.) The order ruled that there remained factual disputes regarding Cendant's 
claim for damages and regarding the Reagans5 claim that Cendant failed to maintain the 
property or had an obligation to purchase additional property, but held that was no reason 
to delay the finality of the order during the pendency of the remaining proceedings and that 
it should become final for purposes of appeal. (Record 200.) 
Following entry of the summary judgment against Reagans, Reagans filed a third-
party complaint against First American Title Co.. (Record 206-202.) That matter also 
remains pending before the trial court. 
*The documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse chronological order, with 
the result that the numbering placed on the documents pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure runs in reverse order on each document. 
2Although the minute entry does not reflect it, apparently an oral motion was made at the 
hearing to certify the summary judgment as final for purposes of appeal. 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
Craig Reagan purchased an 80 acre parcel of land in Wasatch County, and in 1994 
commenced construction of a house on the property. (Record 167-166.) He moved in the 
property in November 1994. He got married March 31,1995, and he and his wife used the 
house as their primary residence until September 1997 when he was required to move to 
Texas in connection with a new job. (Record 165.) 
In June 1997, before he had received the new job offer, he learned that he could save 
three percent interest on his home loan if the parcel securing the loan was less than 10 acres. 
(Record 164.) He contacted the Wasatch County recorder to determine what would be 
necessary to split up the property. He was informed that, so long as he did not break the 
property into more than three parcels, all he would need would be to obtain a description of 
the new parcels and have them recorded with the recorder's office. (Record 163-162.) 
Mr. Reagan's purpose in splitting up the property was to reduce the interest rate on 
his home. (Record 164.) As long as he was at the process, however, he decided to create an 
extra parcel f,[b]ecause I wanted to be able to have the advantage of adding another home 
[for my parents] if I ever needed to." (Record 161.) 
Mr. Reagan had a surveyor prepare a new legal description with two parcels of 
slightly less than 10 acres in addition to the remaining approximately 60 acres. He took the 
survey to a title company and asked them to prepare the appropriate deeds for recording with 
the county to split the property into three separate parcels. (Record 161.) 
5 
Sometime in the late summer or fall of 1997 Mr. Reagan received a job offer with 
Union Pacific which required his moving to Fort Worth, Texas. Part of the offer included 
a relocation benefit to help with the move. (Record 159.) The employer apparently 
contracted with HFS Mobility Services, later Cendant Mobility Services, to provide the 
relocation benefit, and on November 28, 1997, HFS Mobility Services, Inc. agreed to 
purchase the property from Reagans for $375,000. (Record 139-133.) A warranty deed 
implementing the purchase was signed in November 1997 and recorded June 5, 1998. 
(Record 60-59.) 
Jack B. and Joanna M. Zito contracted to purchase the property from Cendant. 
(Record 12-1.) On April 19,1999, Zitos filed a complaint alleging that Cendant had refused 
to close or convey the property and seeking an award of damages. (Record 18-1.) Cendant, 
in turn, filed a third-party complaint against Reagans alleging that Reagans had failed to 
obtain legal approval from Wasatch County to "subdivide'1 their property. (Record 27-26.) 
Cendant settled the Zito complaint for $25,000, (Record 37-35), but refused to disclose to 
Reagans the basis for the settlement nor to give any information concerning damages which 
may have been suffered by Zitos. (Record 82, 90-89.) 
Reagans moved out of the property in September 1997. (Record 165.) The home has 
an HRF heating system which must be kept on during the winter. (Record 158.) Cendant 
apparently did not keep the system running, resulting in a crack in a concrete floor in the 
garage and apparent damage to the heating system. The deck had not been maintained and 
was deteriorated, the house had not been painted, the road had not been maintained and was 
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completely dilapidated and rundown, there were cracks in the tile, a door had been broken 
into, and the toilets had apparently been used even though the plumbing was not operable. 
(Record 153.) 
Cendant filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking rescission. (Record 54-53, 
80-57.) Reagans filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit asserting that Cendant had failed to provide 
adequate responses to discovery focused on the reasonableness of the settlement with Zitos. 
(Record 83-81.) Reagans argued they had not illegally subdivided the property. They also 
asserted that rescission was inappropriate because Cendant had allowed the property to be 
damaged and therefore could not restore the property to the Reagans. (Record 180-84.) 
In the trial court acknowledged that there were factual disputes concerning the extent 
of the damage to the property. The court nonetheless held that rescission was appropriate 
and granted summary judgment to Cendant, reserving the issue of damages. (Record 201-
199.) Reagans thereafter perfected this appeal. (Record 211-209.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was not appropriate under the law, and factual issues precluded 
summary judgment in any event. The division of property at issue in this case would have 
been improper only if it were done for the primary purpose of resale or development. The 
undisputed evidence, however, was that the primary purpose of Mr. Reagan in dividing the 
property was to lower the interest rate on his home loan. Although Mr. Reagan also had a 
vague idea that he might at some indeterminate point in the future use one of the parcels to 
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build a home for his parents, there was no evidence from which the court could have 
determined that this was "the" purpose for the property division. 
At the very least there was a disputed issue of fact as to what was the purpose for 
dividing the property. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Reagans, the evidence 
showed that Reagans did not have any intent to develop or resell the property. 
Even if the division of the property was improper, it did not breach the warranty 
against encumbrances nor the covenant of good right to convey. Any statutory violation did 
not create a lien or other charge against the tile. It was clear that Reagans had full right to 
actually convey everything the warranty deed stated they conveyed. 
Finally, there was an issue of fact as to whether rescission was appropriate. Viewed 
in the light most favorable to Reagans, the evidence showed that Cendant had allowed the 
property to deteriorate and suffer serious damage, and Cendant could not restore the property 
to Reagans in the same condition as it was received. Where restoration of the status quo ante 
is impossible, rescission may not be granted. This factual dispute precluded summary 
judgment of rescission. 
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ARGUMENT 
I: SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATELY 
GRANTED WHERE THERE REMAINED A GENUINE 
FACTUAL DISPUTE REGARDING CRAIG REAGAN'S 
PURPOSE IN DIVIDING HIS LAND. 
Relying on section 17-27-804 of the Utah Code and section 16.04.030 of the Wasatch 
County Code, Cendant argued below and the trial court held that Reagans illegally 
subdivided their property. The definitions of "subdivision" in both the Utah Code and the 
Wasatch County Code, however, exclude a division of property which is not for the purpose 
of resale or development. This exclusion applies here. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103(l)(w) defines "subdivision" as "any land that is 
subdivided, resubdivided or proposed to be divided into two or more lots, parcels, sites, 
units, plots, or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer, 
sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon any and all other plans, 
terms, and conditions." (Italics added.) Wasatch County Code section 16.01.010(97) 
similarly defines "subdivision" as "a tract, lot or parcel of land which has been divided into 
two or more lots, plots, sites, or other division of lander the purpose, whether immediate 
or future, of sale or of building development . . . ." (Italics added.) Neither of these 
definitions, therefore, include within the term "subdivision" a division of land which is not 
for the purpose of resale or development. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of whether the Reagans' 1997 
division of their land into three parcels fell within these definitions. In so ruling, the trial 
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court implicitly held there was no factual dispute that Mr. Reagan's decision to split their 80-
acre property into three parcels was "for the purpose" of future development. See Record 
at 200. The court based this ruling on one selected piece of testimony from Mr. Reagan's 
deposition, where he had stated that he "wanted to be able to have the advantage of adding 
another home if [he] ever needed to." See kL (citing Record at 161). 
In ruling that there was no dispute as to this clearly dispositive question of fact, the 
trial court simply disregarded, without explanation, Mr. Reagan's repeated insistence that 
his decision to divide his property was in fact based upon an altogether different rationale. 
According to Mr. Reagan's testimony in the very same deposition that was relied upon by 
the trial court, his decision to divide his property was instead based upon his belief that he 
could secure a lower interest rate on his homeowner's loan if the plot on which his home was 
being built was 10 acres in size or less. In contrast to the one mention-found on one page 
of his deposition-of the desire to parcel out a place where he might possibly build a home 
for his parents, Mr. Reagan's repeated insistence that the reason for this division was to get 
a better rate on his loan appears on no less than twelve other pages of his deposed testimony. 
See Record at pp. 156,161 -164.3 Relevant examples of Mr. Reagan's explanation of the cost 
of this loan and the resultant decision to parcel out a ten acre plot to reduce the interest rate 
include the following: 
Q. Tell me why you decided to split up the property. 
3Encompassing pages 13-20,23, 28, 47-48 of Mr. Reagan's deposition. 
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A. To reduce the interest rate on my home, because the 
lot size for a conventional loan needed to be ten acres or under 
to drop my interest rate three percent. 
Q. Three percent? 
A. Correct. So I was trying to drop my interest rate to 
get my house payment lower. 
Q. Who told you that it would save you three percent? 
A. The mortgage companies. 
Record at 164. 
Q And sometime in this time frame of June, '97, you 
learned that you could lower your rate three percent? 
A. Correct 
Q. Do you know if you have any documents related to 
the June, '97 refinancing still in your files? 
A. Did not refinance it in June. We were working 
towards that. 
Q. All right. Did you ever refinance it? 
A. Yes. That's what the whole goal is about 
Record at 163 (emphasis added). 
Q. Tell me what steps you took to split the property in 
the summer of '91. 
A. As I learned of this [the lower loan rate available for 
parcels that are 10 acres or smaller], I called the County 
Recorder and asked them what was required for me to be able 
to split my property up. 
Record at 163 (emphasis added). 
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Q. Can you tell me why the property that you split up 
with the house on it is only 9.5 acres? 
A. Just so that it would fall underneath the ten acres but 
be close enough to ten to make it a decent size 
Record at 160. 
Q. Do you remember any discussions with any of the 
real estate agents regarding how you split up the property into 
ten acre pieces . . . ? 
A. I might have with Chris on our listing that, just like 
I say, on that same discussion of, hey, we owned 80, we want to 
split this thing up to get our interest rate down 
Record at 156. 
As is clear from this testimony, Mr. Reagan's decision to parcel his 80 acres into three 
separate lots was in every way related to his desire to get a lower interest rate on his 
homeowners loan. That this was the case is further confirmed by the fact that though Mr. 
Reagan had actually purchased the property in 1989, it wasn't until June of 1997, the same 
month in which he had learned about the potential 3 point drop in interest rate that was 
available to sub-10 acre parcels, that he suddenly decided to divide his land. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment is therefore baffling. In granting 
summary judgment on this point, the court ostensibly found that there was no genuine issue 
of material fact as to this central question. Given the weight of Mr. Reagan's testimony on 
the subject, however, it seems clear that, at the very least, the question of what Mr. Reagan's 
purpose was in dividing the property is an open question that needs to be resolved at trial. 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on this point, this Court views all facts and inferences 
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against the prevailing party. This Court is thus required to view the above listed quotes and 
facts as meaning what Mr. Reagan insists that they meant all along: that Mr. Reagan's 
purpose in dividing his land into three parcels was to secure a lower interest rate on his loan. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should therefore be reversed. 
II. A DIVISION OF LAND WITH AN UNDEFINED, 
UNPLANNED POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE NON-
COMMERCIAL IMPROVEMENT WAS NOT FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF "DEVELOPMENT." 
The second reason that the trial court's summary judgment should be overturned is 
due to the trial court's erroneous interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 7-27-103(l)(w)(i) 
(hereafter referred to as ,f§ 103"). As discussed above, this section defines what type of 
property divisions are included within the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-804 
(hereafter referred to as ,f§ 804,f). The trial court held that § 103 applied to Mr. Reagan's 
division of his property and that his resultant failure to comply with § 804 therefore acted 
as encumbrance upon the land.4 
As noted above, the basis for the trial court's ruling was its determination that "one 
of the purposes11 for Mr. Reagan's division of his property was for "the future development" 
of the property. See Record at 200. In so ruling, the court ignored both the plain language 
and plain meaning of the statute. 
4This discussion applies equally to the Wasatch County ordinances. 
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The text of the statute does not support the broad reading given it by the trial court. 
Rather than imposing the requirements of § 804 on all property owners who have mentally 
contemplated a possible future division of their property, § 103 strictly limits the application 
of § 804 to those who divide the land "for the purpose" of those future developments. The 
trial court's grant of summary judgment because future development was ostensibly "one of 
the purposes" is an overly broad reading that is not in conformity with the plain language of 
the statute. In essence, the trial court's insertion of its own definition-expanding language 
has transformed the statute's meaning. Whereas the text of the statute requires at least a 
showing of primacy, the trial court's reading could now support a wide variety of potential 
inclusions Just so long as it can be shown that those inclusions were "one of the purposes" 
for the division.5 
The Utah Supreme Court has "repeatedly stated (that) statutes must be construed not 
from interpretations of their terms in extraneous contexts, but from 'the plain language of the 
Act' itself." Associated General Contractors v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining. 2001 UT112, 
f^ 27,38 P.3d 291 (citations omitted). Further, "only if there is ambiguity [in a statute] do we 
look beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations." Statev.Lusk. 
5In its reply brief on the initial motion for summary judgment, Cendant suggested that this 
reading would "create an exception to the subdivision laws that would swallow their 
purpose." Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Cendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 5. This argument misses the point of the statute. 
According to the express terms of 804, the very purpose of § 103 is to act as a definitional 
exemption to the subdivision requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 804(1) (stating that 
"unless exempt under section 17-27-806 or not included in the definition of a subdivision 
under subsection 17-27-103(1)", the requirements of § 804 are to apply). 
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2001 UT 102, <p9, 37 P.3d 1103. In the present case, it is thus important to note what this 
statute does and does not say. The statute does not say that § 804's requirements apply when 
future development is "a purpose'1 or ,fa substantial purpose" or even "one of the purposes." 
Section 103 plainly states that § 804 applies when future development is "the purpose" of the 
division. A plain language reading of the article "the,"coupled with the fact that "purpose" 
is listed as a singular noun, actually seems to indicate that the statute contemplates 
application of 804 only when development is the only purpose. Even if one does not 
subscribe to such a strict reading of the statute, however, it is nevertheless clear that, given 
the restrictive language used in the statute, a degree of primacy of purpose is obviously 
required. At the very least, it seems to require something more than an incidental motivation 
such as was present here. 
In its expansion of § 804fs inclusiveness, the trial court does not at all attempt to 
define how much of a factor a motivation has to be in order to be considered "one of the 
purposes." The trial court does not tell us, for example, whether a motivation needs to have 
been responsible for at least 50% of the decision to divide to be considered "one of the 
purposes," or whether even a lesser motivation might suffice. If a particular motivation were 
only 40% responsible for the decision to divide, does that qualify? Does a motivation that 
was 30% responsible qualify? If the possibility of future development was only 5% 
responsible for the decision to divide, is that sufficient to be considered "one of the 
purposes," thereby requiring registration of the plat? The statute plainly requires the 
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registration of a plat whenever development is "the purpose" of the property division. That 
language is simply not as inclusive as the trial court's ruling would suggest. 
Further, it is not even clear that Mr. Reagan had any purpose to further develop his 
land, let alone having such future development as the purpose. As noted above, Mr. Reagan 
has made it clear that the division of his land was based upon a desire to lower the interest 
rate on his loan. In ruling that this was not "the purpose" of his division, the trial court 
erroneously relied upon his statement that he "wanted to be able to have the advantage of 
adding another home if he ever needed to." Explaining this, Mr. Reagan noted that "(his) 
parents had talked about moving up there some day," and that, since he was already dividing 
the property anyways, he thought that he would go ahead and make the change now so as to 
be able to avoid having to redivide his land again if his parents ever actually decided to 
move. Record at 161. 
Something that is a "purpose" acts as a motivator. In order to rule that the "purpose" 
of the division was for future development, one would have to conclude that Mr. Reagan 
took the steps necessary to divide his land because o/his desire to possibly build for his 
parents. This simply isn't the case. As the sole owner of the 80 acres, Mr. Reagan did not 
need to divide his property in order to build a house for his parents. The land was already 
his, and, subject to zoning laws, he could have built on it at will. If not for the fact that he 
was already engaged in the division process due to his own interest in procuring a lower 
loan, it seems clear that there would have been no division of the land in the summer of 
1997. 
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Had Mr. Reagan started preparing the land for the building of his parents' home, that 
might indicate that there was a purpose for a future development. Had Mr. Reagan run water 
or power over to that spot, that might indicate that there was a purpose for a future 
development. Had Mr. Reagan had the land appraised for such a building, that might 
indicate that there was a purpose for such a development. Had Mr. Reagan and his parents 
decided on a date or year in which they would move to that spot, that might indicate that 
there was a purpose for a such a development. Had Mr. Reagan's parents even affirmatively 
made up their minds that they were in fact going to move to that spot, then that decision 
might be said to have acted as a "purpose" in Mr. Reagan's redivision of his land. None of 
this had happened, however.6 Instead, at the time that Mr. Reagan decided to subdivide his 
land, his parents had made no decision as to when or even if they would move onto his 
property. His decision to parcel out a spot for them while in the midst of his own division 
of property therefore seems to be nothing more than an incidental act done to make more 
convenient a decision that had not yet even been made. Would Mr. Reagan have divided his 
property in June 1997 in the absence of any potential plans to move his parents? Yes, to take 
advantage of a lower interest rate on his bank loan. Would Mr. Reagan have divided his 
property in the absence of that potentially lower bank loan, just to make easier the still 
unplanned, long "talked about" potential move of his parents? No. 
6Indeed, to this day, Mr. Reagan's parents have still not decided whether they will ever 
move up to a spot on his property. 
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This Court should hold that the purpose requirement of § 804 at least requires a 
showing of motivated primacy. The grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
Ill: SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF RESCISSION WAS 
IMPROPER WHERE THERE WERE FACTUAL 
DISPUTES CONCERNING WHETHER CENDANT 
COULD RESTORE THE PROPERTY TO STATUS QUO. 
Two elementary rules of rescission are that it is an equitable remedy available only 
when a remedy at law is unavailable, and even in equity rescission is not available if the 
parties cannot be placed in status quo ante. 50 West Broadway Associates v. Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake Citv. 784 P.2d 1162,1170-71 (Utah 1989); Coalville City v. Lundgren. 
930 P.2d 1206, 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Neither requirement was met here. 
The trial court acknowledged that factual disputes existed as to the amount of damage 
to the property. (Record 200.) Reagans presented evidence of significant damage to the 
property, including a cracked floor which apparently damaged the heating system and a 
generally deteriorated condition of the property. (E.g., Record 153.) Where there was a 
dispute as to the amount and extent of the damage, it is difficult to understand how the trial 
court could have concluded, as a matter of law, that Reagans could be placed back in status 
quo ante. 
By the same logic, if the damages were such that Reagans could be placed back in 
status quo, then Cendant had an adequate remedy at law. Cendant's position in this 
transaction was solely to fulfill a contractual requirement to purchase and then resell 
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Reagans' property-the property had no intrinsic value to Cendant. If the zoning problems 
impacted the resale value and were legally actionable, then Cendant's remedy was an action 
at law on the contract or on the warranty deed. 
Because there was an adequate remedy at law, and a dispute as to whether Reagans 
could be placed in status quo, rescission was improper. 
IV: EVEN IF THERE WAS AN IMPROPER SUBDIVISION, 
IT DID NOT BREACH ANY WARRANTY OF THE 
WARRANTY DEED. 
Reagans conveyed title to Cendant by warranty deed. The trial court held the 
sale to Cendant "violated that warranties in the Reagans' deed to Cendant of the right to sell 
and the covenant against encumbrances." (Record 200.) Holmes Development. LLC v. 
Cook. 2002 UT 38, decided after the trial court's ruling, establishes there was no breach of 
the warranty deed. 
A. There was no breach of the covenant of good right to convey because Reagans 
conveyed good title. 
Holmes stated that "if a warranty deed comports with Utah law, then the five 
covenants of title articulated therein implicitly apply to the real property conveyance: (1) the 
covenant of seisin, (2) the covenant of right to convey, (3) the covenant against 
encumbrances, (4) the covenant of warranty, and (5) the covenant of quiet enjoyment." Id 
f 33. It appears likely the trial court's reference here to the warranty of right to sell was to 
the covenant of right to convey. Holmes explained that covenant as follows: 
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Similarly, in making the covenant of the right to convey, a 
grantor guarantees that the grantor has the legal right to convey 
the estate the deed purports to convey. Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-
12 (providing that grantor covenants "he has good right to 
convey premises11); see also... Seymour [v. Evans], 608 So. 2d 
[1141] at 1144 [(Miss. 1992)]. Essentially, the covenants of 
seisin and the right to convey are synonymous, and the analysis 
of whether a grantor breached one of these covenants is the 
same for either covenant. 
Hence, the covenants of seisin and right to convey, if 
found in a warranty deed, attest that the grantor covenants that 
it has good title to the estate purportedly conveyed. 
Consequently, the grantor breaches these covenants when it is 
shown that the grantor did not own the land that he purported to 
convey by the warranty deed description. 
Holmes. 2002 UT 38. fflf 34-35 (some citations omitted, quotation marks omitted). 
The Seymour case cited by the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the 
conveyance of an illegally subdivided lot breached the covenants of seisen and good right 
to convey. The court rejected that claim, holding that "a deed which runs afoul of 
subdivision regulations is perfectly valid despite the violation." 608 So.2d at 1145. 
Because Reagans owned the land sold to Cendant and validly conveyed everything 
they owned, there was no breach of the covenant of good right to convey. 
B. A zoning restriction is not an encumbrance. 
Holmes Development LLC v. Cook. 2002 UT 38, summarized the law regarding the 
covenant against encumbrances as follows: 
A grantor in a warranty deed in Utah warrants to the grantee, 
among other things, that the premises are free from all 
encumbrances.. . . This court has defined an encumbrance as 
"any interest in a third person consistent with a title in fee in the 
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grantee, if such outstanding interest injuriously affects the value 
of the property," or "constitutes a burden or limitation upon the 
rights of the fee title holder." 
2002 UT 38, Tf 44 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The claimed statutory violation here was not an interest in a third person, and 
therefore was not an encumbrance. In Ellis v. Hale. 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962), 
the Utah Supreme Court considered a claim for damages arising out of a claimed illegal 
subdivision. The seller prepared a subdivision plat, but it was never approved nor recorded. 
Notwithstanding the lack of approval or recording, the seller sold four lots in the purported 
subdivision. The city refused to grant building permits to the buyers because of the illegal 
subdivision. The buyers sued the seller, but the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure 
to state a cause of action. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. 
As in this case, the buyers in Ellis claimed the seller violated the county ordinance 
and state statutes. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting that the ordinance and 
statutes "impose a duty running to the sovereign, and a violation thereof does not necessarily 
give rise to civil liability." 373 P.2d at 384. 
The Ellis court did not address whether the illegal subdivision also breached any of 
the warranties in a warranty deed, because the issue was not raised in the complaint. A 
recent Idaho Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed this issue. Hoffer v. Callister. 
Docket No. 27077,2002 Idaho LEXIS 71 (May 6,2002). Hoffer purchased a mobile home 
park which had 27 mobile home spaces. A few years thereafter, Hoffer discovered that the 
zoning regulations only allowed 16 mobile home spaces and brought suit against his vendors. 
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As an instant case, there was no claim that any of the defendants were aware of the zoning 
restrictions nor that they made any representation of the contrary in the sale documents. 
The Hoffer court noted that the Idaho statutes defined encumbrances as including 
"taxes, assessments, and all liens upon real property." The court held that nothing in this 
definition or in other Idaho cases would support holding the zoning violations were 
encumbrances. 
The Idaho statute and cases are consistent with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Court has defined "encumbrance" as "any right that a third party holds in land which 
constitutes a burden or limitation upon the rights of the fee title holder." Bergstrom v. 
Moore. 677 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah 1984). Accord Brewer v. Peatross. 595 P.2d 866, 868 
(Utah 1979); Boothe v. Wvatt 54 Utah 550, 183 P. 323, 324 (1919). With a statutory 
violation, there is no "third party" who holds a right in the land. As explained by Ellis v. 
Hale. 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382, 384 (1962), subdivision regulations impose a duty 
running to the sovereign, not to private individuals. Reagans did not breach of the covenant 
against encumbrances. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a genuine factual dispute as to whether Mr. Reagan's purpose in dividing his 
land was to facilitate future development. Also, the evidence showed the primary purpose 
of the division was to obtain a lower interest rate, and not for development. This Court 
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should hold that a division of land is for "the purpose" of development only if development 
is the primary purpose of the division. 
Even if the subdivision was improper, there was no actionable breach of any covenant 
of the warranty deed, and rescission was improper because the extent of damage to the 
property was disputed. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for 
trial. 
DATED this 2Yffay of June, 2002. 
DON R. PETERSEN and / f 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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Order Granting Cendant's Motion for Summary Judgment against the Reagans 
and rule 54(b) Determination (R. 201-199) 
Bruce R. Baird #0176 
Baird & Jones, L. C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Cendant Mobility 
201 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 328-1400 
Fax:(801)328-1444 
Email: brblaw@hqutah.com 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY 
JACK B. AND JOANNA M. ZITO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES 
Defendants. 
CENDANT MOBILITY SERVICES 
Third-Party-Plaintiff, 
V D . 
CRAIG & KYLIE REAGAN 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING CENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE REAGANS AND RULE 
54(B) DETERMINATION 
Civil No.: 990500160 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
This matter came before the Court on July 18, 2001, the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, 
Judge, presiding, pursuant to a Motion by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Cendant Mobility 
Services ("Cendant") pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for Summary 
Judgment against Third-Party Defendants Craig and Kylie Reagan ("the Reagans"). Cendant was 
represented by its counsel, Bruce R. Baird of Baird & Jones and the Reagans were represented by 
their counsel, Don R. Peterson of Howard Lewis & Peterson. The Court reviewed the pleadings 
and heard the arguments of counsel. Being thus fully apprised in the matter, the Court hereby 
$A£> 
finds that there are no genuine disputes regarding any material issue of fact on the following 
matters. 
By virtue of his own testimony, Mr. Reagan established that when he split the property he 
and Ms. Reagan owned into three pieces one of his purposes for doing so was the future 
development of the property. Pursuant to Section 17-27-804, Utah Code Annotated, and Section 
16.04.030, Wasatch County Code, this intent required that a subdivision plat be presented to and 
approved by Wasatch County. The Reagans failed to meet that requirement and thus the portion 
of the Reagans' property sold to Cendant was not a lawful parcel of property. The sale to 
Cendant thus violated both State and County law. The sale also violated the warranties in the 
Reagans' deed to Cendant of the right to sell and the covenant against encumbrances. Section 
57-1-12, U.C.A. The Reagans are not excused from complying with the subdivision laws by 
their claimed reliance on the verbal instructions of a functionary employee of Wasatch County. 
The breach of the warranties and the illegality of the sale to Cendant renders the sale 
void. The proper remedy for the void sale is rescission. 
The Court determines that there are or may be factual disputes regarding Cendant's 
claims for damages for the Reagans for the amounts that Cendant paid to settle with the Zitos and 
for Cendant* s claims for interest on the monies paid to the Reagans for the illegal sale. There 
also are or may be factual disputes regarding the claims by the Reagans that Cendant failed to 
maintain the property and/or that Cendant has a contractual obligation to purchase the entire 80 
acres owned by the Reagans. 
The Court specifically finds and determines that there is no just reason for delaying the 
finality of this judgment during the pendency of the remaining proceedings and that this 
Judgment and Order should become final for the purposes of appeal upon its entry. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
The sale from the Reagans to Cendant of the property that is the subject of this action is 
declared null and void and rescinded. The Reagans are given until August 17, 2001 to file any 
counterclaims or any third-party actions related to this matter. All other issues related to this 
matter are reserved for further disposition. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Judgment and Order shall become fmal for the purposes of appeal upon entry. 
Don R. Peterson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this L° day of July, 2001 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING CENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE REAGANS was mailed, postage prepaid addressed to the following: 
Don R. Peterson 
Howard Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
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Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-103 (2001) 
§ 17-27-103. Definitions -- Notice 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Billboard" means a freestanding ground sign located 
on industrial, commercial, or residential property if the 
sign is designed or intended to direct attention to a 
business, product, or service that is not sold, offered, or 
existing on the property where the sign is located. 
(b) "Chief executive officer" means the person or body 
that exercises the executive powers of the county. 
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of 
its unique characteristics or potential impact on the county, 
surrounding neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be 
compatible in some areas or may be compatible only if certain 
conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the 
detrimental impacts. 
(d) "Constitutional taking" has the meaning as defined 
in Section 63-34-13. 
(e) "County" means the unincorporated area of the 
county. 
(f) "Elderly person" means a person who is 60 years old 
or older, who desires or needs to live with other elderly 
persons in a group setting, but who is capable of living 
independently. 
(g) "Gas corporation'1 has the same meaning as defined 
in Section 54-2-1. 
(h) (i) "General plan" means a document that a county 
adopts that sets forth general guidelines for proposed future 
development of the land within the county, as set forth in 
Sections 17-27-301 and 17-27-302. 
(ii) "General plan" includes what is also commonly 
referred to as a "master plan." 
(i) "Interstate pipeline company" means a person or 
entity engaged in natural gas transportation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717 et seq. 
(j) "Intrastate pipeline company" means a person or 
entity engaged in natural gas transportation that is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717 et 
seq. 
(k) "Legislative body" means the county legislative 
body, or for a county that has adopted an alternative form of 
government, the body exercising legislative powers. 
(1) "Lot line adjustment" means the relocation of the 
property boundary line between two adjoining lots with the 
consent of the owners of record. 
(m) "Municipality" means a city or town. 
(n) "Nonconforming structure" means a structure that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning 
designation; and 
(ii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not 
conform with the zoning regulation's setback, height 
restrictions, or other regulations that govern the structure. 
(o) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning 
designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time 
the zoning regulation governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not 
conform with the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
(p) "Official map" has the same meaning as provided in 
Section 72-5-401. 
(q) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
partnership, organization, association, trust, governmental 
agency, or any other legal entity. 
(r) "Plat" means a map or other graphical representation 
of lands being laid out and prepared in accordance with 
Section 17-27-804. 
(s) "Record of survey map" means a map of a survey of 
land prepared in accordance with Section 17-23-17. 
(t) (i) "Residential facility for elderly persons" means 
a single-family or multiple-family dwelling unit that meets 
the requirements of Part 5 and any ordinance adopted under 
authority of that part. 
(ii) "Residential facility for elderly persons" does 
not include a health care facility as defined by Section 26-
21-2. 
(u) "Special district" means all entities established 
under the authority of Title 17A, Special Districts, and any 
other governmental or quasi-governmental entity that is not 
a county, municipality, school district, or unit of the 
state. 
(v) "Street" means public rights-of-way, including 
highways, avenues, boulevards, parkways, roads, lanes, walks, 
alleys, viaducts, subways, tunnels, bridges, public 
easements, and other ways. 
(w) (i) "Subdivision" means any land that is divided, 
resubdivided or proposed to be divided into two or more lots, 
parcels, sites, units, plots, or other division of land for 
the purpose, whether immediate or future, for offer, sale, 
lease, or development either on the installment plan or upon 
any and all other plans, terms, and conditions. 
(ii) "Subdivision" includes the division or 
development of land whether by deed, metes and bounds 
description, devise and testacy, lease, map, plat, or other 
recorded instrument. 
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include: 
(A) a bona fide division or partition of 
agricultural land for agricultural purposes; 
(B) a recorded agreement between owners of 
adjoining properties adjusting their mutual boundary if: 
(I) no new lot is created; and 
(II) the adjustment does not result in a 
violation of applicable zoning ordinances; 
(C) a recorded document, executed by the owner of 
record, revising the legal description of more than one 
contiguous parcel of property into one legal description 
encompassing all such parcels of property; or 
(D) a bona fide division or partition of land in 
a county other than a first class county for the purpose of 
siting, on one or more of the resulting separate parcels: 
(I) an unmanned facility appurtenant to a 
pipeline owned or operated by a gas corporation, interstate 
pipeline company, or intrastate pipeline company; or 
(II) an unmanned telecommunications, microwave, 
fiber optic, electrical, or other utility service 
regeneration, transformation, retransmission, or 
amplification facility. 
(iv) The joining of a subdivided parcel of property 
to another parcel of property that has not been subdivided 
does not constitute a "subdivision" under this Subsection 
(1) (w) as to the unsubdivided parcel of property or subject 
the unsubdivided parcel to the county's subdivision 
ordinance. 
(x) "Unincorporated" means the area outside of the 
incorporated boundaries of cities and towns. 
(2) (a) A county meets the requirements of reasonable 
notice required by this chapter if it: 
(i) posts notice of the hearing or meeting in at 
least three public places within the jurisdiction and 
publishes notice of the hearing or meeting in a newspaper of 
general circulation in the jurisdiction, if one is available; 
or 
(ii) gives actual notice of the hearing or meeting. 
(b) A county legislative body may enact an ordinance 
establishing stricter notice requirements than those required 
by this Subsection (2). 
(c) (i) Proof that one of the two forms of notice 
authorized by this Subsection (2) was given is prima facie 
evidence that notice was properly given. 
(ii) If notice given under authority of this section 
is not challenged as provided in Section 17-27-1001 within 30 
days from the date of the meeting for which the notice was 
given, the notice is considered adequate and proper. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-27-103, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 
58; 1992, ch. 23, § 25; 1993, ch. 227, § 150; 1995, ch. 
179, § 8; 1997, ch. 90, § 1; 1997, ch. 108, § 5; 1997, ch. 
151, § 3; 1998, ch. 89, § 2; 1999, ch. 139, § 1; 1999, ch. 
291, § 4; 2000, ch. 34, § 4; 2000, ch. 209, § 9; 2001, ch. 
66, § 1; 2001, ch. 241, § 30. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1997 amendment by ch. 90, effective 
May 5, 1997, deleted "or of commercial, manufacturing, or 
industrial land for commercial, manufacturing or industrial 
purposes" from the end of Subsection (1) (r) (iii) (A) 
(Subsection (1)(p)(iii)(A) of the reconciled version). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 108, effective May 5, 1997, 
deleted definitions of "handicapped person" and "residential 
facility for handicapped persons," redesignating subsections 
accordingly, and made a stylistic change. For present 
provisions covering residences for persons with disabilities, 
see § 17-27-605. 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 151, effective May 5, 1997, 
added Subsections (1) (r) (iii) (B) and (C) (which are 
Subsections (1) (p) (iii) (B) and (C) in the reconciled 
version). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, added 
Subsection (1)(p)(iv). 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 139, effective May 3, 1999, 
added Subsections (1) (f) , (1) (h) , (1) (i) , and (1) (s) (iii) (D) 
(Subsections (1) (g) , (1) (i) , (l)(j), and (1) (t) (iii) (D) in 
the reconciled version), redesignating the other subsections 
accordingly and making related changes. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 291, effective May 3, 1999, 
added Subsection (1)(d), making related designation changes 
and updating the internal references. 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 34, effective May 1, 2000, 
rewrote the definition of "official map" in Subsection 
(1) (p) . 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 209, effective May 1, 2000, 
added Subsections (1) (q) to (1) (s) , redesignating former 
Subsections (1) (q) to (1) (u) as (1) (t) to (1) (x) and making 
one related change. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 66, effective April 30, 2001, 
added Subsection (1) (w) (iii) (D) (II) and made related 
changes. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 241, effective April 30, 2001, 
in Subsection (1)(b) substituted "person or body that 
exercises the executive powers of the county" for "county 
executive, or if the county has adopted an alternative form 
of government, the official who exercises the executive 
powers." 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-804 (2001) 
§ 17-27-804. Plats required 
(1) Unless exempt under Section 17-27-806 or not included 
in the definition of a subdivision under Subsection 17-27-
103(1), whenever any lands are divided, the owner of those 
lands shall have an accurate plat made of them that sets 
forth and describes: 
(a) all the parcels of ground divided, by their 
boundaries, course, and extent, and whether they are intended 
for streets or other public uses, together with any areas 
that are reserved for public purposes; and 
(b) the lot or unit reference, the block or building 
reference, the street or site address, the street name or 
coordinate address, the acreage or square footage for all 
parcels, units, or lots, and the length and width of the 
blocks and lots intended for sale. 
(2) (a) The owner of the land shall acknowledge the plat 
before an officer authorized by law to take the 
acknowledgement of conveyances of real estate. 
(b) The surveyor making the plat shall certify it. 
(c) The county executive shall approve the plat as 
provided in this part. Before the county executive may 
approve a plat, the owner of the land shall provide the 
county executive with a tax clearance indicating that all 
taxes, interest, and penalties owing on the land have been 
paid. 
(3) After the plat has been acknowledged, certified, and 
approved, the owner of the land shall record it in the county 
recorder's office in the county in which the lands platted 
and laid out are situated. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-27-804, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 235, § 
97; 1994, ch. 17, § 1; 1995, ch. 181, § 3; 1997, ch. 151, 
§ 4; 1998, Ch. 13, § 12; 2000, ch. 209, § 10; 2001, ch. 
241, § 36. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
inserted "or not included in the definition of a subdivision 
under Subsection 17-27-103 (1) (r) " in Subsection (1). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, updated the 
second section reference in Subsection (1). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, rewrote 
Subsection (1)(b) and deleted "map or" before "plat" in the 
second sentence of Subsection (2)(c). 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted 
"executive" for "legislative body" in Subsection (2) (c) and 
made stylistic changes. 
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16.01.030. Zones Established. 
16.01.040. Official Zone Map. 
16.01.050. Boundaries of 
Zones• 
16.01.010. Definitions. 
All terms used in Title 16 
which are not specifically-
defined herein are to be given 
their usual and standard 
definition. Disputes as to 
the definition of a term not 
specifically defined herein 
shall be referred to the Board 
of Adjustment for resolution. 
For purposes of this title: 
(1) "Agriculture" is defined 
as the act or science of 
cultivating the ground, the 
act or science of the 
production of plants and 
animals usefux to man or 
beast; and includes^gardening 
or horticultural fruit 
growing, storage and 
marketing. 
(2) "Agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes" means a 
tract of land which has been 
approved by the Planning 
Commission as a tract of 
agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes in 
accordance with Section 
16.04.280. 
(3) "Bed and Breakfast" Bed 
and Breakfast Establishments: 
An establishment in a private 
dwelling that supplies 
temporary accommodations to 
overnight guests for a fee. 
(4) "Boarding house" means a 
building containing sleeping 
apartments where meals are 
provided from a common kitchen 
for compensation pursuant to 
previous arrangements on a 
daily, weekly, or monthly 
basis as distinguished from a 
hotel, cafe, or rooming house. 
(5) "Bond" means a document 
which complies with the 
standards contained in Title 
16 and binds the parties 
thereto to take certain action 
if particular conditions are 
not met. 
(6) "Building" means any 
structure built for the 
support, shelter, or enclosure 
of persons, animals, chattels, 
or property of any kind. 
(a) "Main building" means one 
or more of the principal 
16-1 
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buildings upon a lot. Garages, 
carports and other buildings 
which are attached to a 
dwelling or other main 
building or which are situated 
within ten feet of a main 
building shall be considered 
as a part of the main 
building. 
(b) "Accessory building" means 
a subordinate building more 
than ten feet away from any 
main building, the use of 
which is incidental to that of 
a main building. 
(7) "Building site" means the 
total area covered by a 
building, plus a 20 foot strip 
around the exterior of the 
building, and, if a septic 
tank is to serve the building, 
such area as is required for 
normal functioning of a septic 
tank drain field as determined 
in accordance with state and 
County standards. 
(8) "Central sewage disposal 
system" means a system of 
pipes which collects liquid 
waste from two or more 
separate and independent 
sources and delivers the waste 
to an approved common disposal 
facility. 
(9) "Club/ limited membership" 
means a building or other 
structures constructed in 
accordance with a properly 
approved plan and used as an 
integral part of a park or 
large scale development and 
operated by an organized 
association of persons for 
j social, fraternal, religious, 
or patriotic purposes for the 
benefit of the members and 
guests and not for the general 
public, and shall include 
eating facilities, club 
I administrative offices, 
off-street parking and retail 
establishments for the sale of 
goods and services consumed on 
the premises. It shall also 
include auxiliary recreational 
facilities such as swimming 
pools, gymnasiums, tennis, 
courts and hunting preserves, 
but a limited membership club 
shall not include sleeping 
accommodations nor facilities 
which are open to use by the 
general public. 
(10) "Common area" means an 
area of common ownership 
designed to serve the 
recreational, open space or 
other similar needs of two or 
more lots or dwelling units in 
separate ownership. 
(11) "Comprehensive General 
plan" means a coordinated plan 
which has been prepared and 
adopted by the County for the 
purpose of guiding 
development, including but not 
limited to a plan or plans of 
land use, resources, 
circulation, housing, and 
public facilities and grounds. 
' (12) "Conditional Use" means 
j a use which has been 
specifically permitted by the 
terms of this code and which 
requires special consideration 
by the Board of Adjustment, 
6-2 
/ A // 
Planning Commission, or County 
Commission before a permit 
therefor may be issued by the 
zoning administrator or 
building inspector. 
(13) "Condominium unit", or 
"condominium11 means a unit in 
a condominium project. 
(14) "Condominium project" 
means a project planned in 
accordance with the Utah 
Condominium Ownership Act, 
including, without limitation", 
all units, limited common 




establishments which are 
designed for and intended to 
serve the daily or frequent 
trade or service needs of 
people who reside, visit or 
vacation in a particular large 
scale development. Such 
establishments include cafes, 
gasoline service stations, 
grocery, variety and drug 
stores, coin-operated 
laundries and dry-cleaning 
establishments, beauty and 
barber shops when associated 
with a planned residential 
development, and sporting 
goods,, camera and curio 
stores, or a combination 
thereof, when associated with 
a planned recreation 
development; but convenience 
establishments do not include 
repair garages, automobile 
sales yards, wholesale 
establishments and other such 
enterprises. 
(16) "Critical angle of 
repose" means the degree of 
slope at which earth material 
at the surface of the ground 
moves of its own accord in 
response to the force of 
gravity. 
(17) "Density" means the term 
density shall mean the number 
of dwelling units and sleeping 
apartments per acre of land. 
(13) "Density standards" "means 
the minimum, maximum and 
average lot sizes and the 
maximum number of dwelling 
units and sleeping apartments 
permitted in a planned 
recreation development. 
(19) "Developer" means any 
person or entity proposing to 
divide land for the purposes 
of selling smaller parcels, or 
any person or entity proposing 
to change or increase the use 
of a tract of land in Wasatch 
County. 
(20) "Development credit" 
means a right or entitlement 
to construct a dwelling, which 
right or entitlement is 
unusable within a zone or 
situation but which may be 
transferred and used within 
another zone or situation. 
(21) "Driveway" means a strip 
of land not over 100 feet long 
designed to serve for access 
to one dwelling unit. 
(22) "Dwelling" means a one 
family dwelling, two-family 
dwelling, multiple-family 




dwelling, faun caretaker's 
dwelling, or industrial 
caretaker's dwelling. 
(a) "Dwelling unit" means one 
or more rooms in a building 
designed for living purposes, 
that is, bathing, eating, and 
sleeping, and occupied by or 
designed for one family. 
(b) "One-family dwelling" or 
"single-family dwelling" means 
a building containing one 
dwelling unit. 
(c) "Two-family dwelling" 
means a building containing 
two dwelling units. 
(d) "Kultiple-family dwelling" 
means a building containing 
three or more dwelling units. 
(e) "Commercial caretaker's 
dwelling" means a building 
containing a dwelling unit 
which is occupied by an 
individual or a family whose 
primary responsibility is to 
secure the premises and to 
perform work thereon which is 
incidental to the commercial 
use conducted on the premises. 
(f) "Farm caretaker's 
dwelling" means a building 
containing a single dwelling 
unit which is located on 
agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes. 
(g) "Industrial caretaker's 
dwelling" means a building 
containing a dwelling unit 
which is occupied by an 
individual or a family whose 
primary responsibility is to 
secure the premises and to 
I perfo-ui work thereon which is 
incidental to the industrial 
use conducted on the premises. 
(h) "Vacation dwelling" means 
a building containing a 
dwelling unit which is only 
occupied intermittently by one 
or more individuals or 
families which are permanently 
housed elsewhere or have 
permanent dwellings elsewhere. 
(23) "Environment" means the 
sum total of the surroundings, 
including both natural and 
man-made factors. 
(24) "Environmental impact 
statement" means a statement 
describing the impact that a 
development will likely have 
on the natural features of the 
immediate area, and the social 
and financial impact, which a 
development will likely have 
on the County as a whole. 
(25) "Family" means an 
individual or two or more 
persons related by law, blood, 
marriage, or adoption, living 
together in a single dwelling 
unit and maintaining a common 
household. Family shall not be 
construed to mean a group of 
^on-related individuals, a 
fraternity, a club, or an 
institutional group. 
(26) "Family care home" means 
a dwelling wherein room, 
board, care, and supervision 
are provided by the resident 
family in a home setting to 
persons who are handicapped, 
mentally ill, or mentally 
retarded and who are provided 
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with a program of services 
including training in 
vocational and recreational 
activities. To qualify, the 
dwelling must be approved or 
operated by the Division of 
Community Services of the 
State Training School or other 
appropriate state agency. 
(27) "Family day-care center" 
means a dwelling or place of 
business wherein ordinary care 
and supervision are provided 
during customary daytime 
periods by the resident family 
to non-related persons. To 
qualify, the dwelling or place 
of business must be approved 
by the Utah State Department 
of Social Services. 
(28) "Farm" means a business 
enterprise in which land is 
used for the production of 
food, feed, or fiber. 
(29) "Farm Preservation 
Subdivision" means a 
subdivision which meets the 
requirements of Section 
16,04.200 ££ seq, 
(30) "Fence, sight-obscuring" 
means a fence having a height 
of at least eight feet above 
grade which permits vision 
through not more than 10% of 
each square foot more than 
eight inches above ground. 
(31) "Final plan" means a plan 
of development showing the 
layout and dimensions of the 
streets, easements, common 
areas and other features of a 
development in accurate 
detail, prepared in accordance 
with County standards. 
(32) "Final plat" means a plat 
or plats of a large scale 
development which has been 
prepared for recording 
purposes in accordance with 
County standards. 
(33) "Flood, 100 year" means a 
flood of a magnitude which 
will probably occur only once 
in 100 years. 
(34) "Flood channel" means a 
natural or artificial water 
course with definite bed and 
banks to confine and conduct 
flood water. 
(35) "Forfeiture" means the 
loss of ones' rights because 
of a failure to abide by the 
terms of an agreement. 
(36) "Flood plain" means an 
area of land adjoining a 
river, stream, water course, 
or lake, which has been or 
probably would be covered with 
water in the event of a 100 
year flood. 
(37) "Floor area" means the 
sum of the areas of the 
several floors of a building, 
including basements, 
mezzanines, and penthouses of 
headroom height of six feet or 
more, measured from the 
exterior of walls or from the 
center line of walls 
separating buildings. The 
floor area does not include 
unoccupied features such as 
pipe trenches, exterior 
terraces or steps, chimneys, 
and roof overhangs. 
(3 8) "Foster care home" means 
1 
a dwelling unit wherein room, 
board, care, and supervision 
are provided by the resident 
family to children who are 
unrelated to the resident 
family under the approval and 
supervision of the Utah State 
Department of Social Services 
or other placement agency 
licensed by the state. 
(39) "Fractional numbers or 
measurements" means any 
computation or measurement 
resulting in a fractional 
number will be rounded down to 
the next smaller whole number; 
for example, 23.75 -inches 
would be rounded down to 23 
inches. 
(40) "Grade": 
(a) "For a building fronting 
on one street only11 means the 
elevation of the sidewalk or 
center line of the street, 
whichever is higher, at right 
angles to the midpoint of the 
fronting wall* 
(b) "For a building fronting 
on more than one street" means 
the average of the grades 
obtained with respect to each 
of the fronting streets by 
considering that the building 
fronts only on each such 
fronting street at a time. 
(c) "For a building having no 
walls fronting on a street" 
means the average level of the 
sidewalk or center line of the 
closest surrounding'street, 
whichever is higher. 
(d) "For a street or driveway" 
means the ratio of vertical 
di_~ance traversed to 
horizontal distance traversec 
when moving along such street 
or driveway expressed in 
either percentage or degree. 
(41) "Grazing" means the act 
of eating forage growing fror 
the ground. 
(42) "Guest" means a person 
staying or receiving services 
for compensation at a hotel, 
motel, boarding house, roomi: 
house, rest home, or similar 
use. 
(43) "Height of building" 
means the weighted average 
vertical distance from the 
grade of the building to the 
top of the building walls. 
(44) "Hog farm" or "piggery" 
means a tract of land and 
facilities for the raising a 
feeding of an average of 25 
more swine for a period of 
time exceeding 100 days in a 
calendar year. 
(45) "Home occupation" means 
any occupation conducted 
within a dwelling, other tha 
a vacation dwelling, and 
carried on by persons residi 
in the dwelling. 
^46) "Hospital" means a 
building in which ten or mor 
ill or injured human beings 
are offered board and room 
while being treated for suet 
illness or injury in 
accordance with instructions 
and procedures prescribed b} 
persons registered to practi 
the healing sciences in 'the 
State of Utah. 
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(47) "Information brochure" I 
means a statement setting 
forth the organizational 
structure of the Property-
Owners Association, and the 
rights and obligations of the 
owner, the developer, the 
Property Owners Association, 
the individual lot or home 
owners, and the County. 
(48) "Junk yard" means a place 
where scrap, waste, discarded 
or salvaged materials are 
bought, sold, exchanged, 
baled, packed, disassembled, 
handled, or stored, including 
auto wrecking yards, house 
wrecking yards, used lumber 
yards and places or yards for 
storage of salvaged house 
wrecking and structural steel 
materials and equipment; but 
not including places where 
such uses are conducted 
entirely within a completely 
enclosed building or where 
salvaged materials are kept 
incidental to manufacturing 
operations conducted on the' 
premises. 
(49) "Kennel" An establishment 
in which dogs or cats are 
housed, groomed, bred, 
boarded, trained, or sold for 
commercial purposes. 
(50) "Landscaping" means the 
application or use of some 
combination of planted trees, 
shrubs, vines, ground cover, 
flowers, or lawns. It also 
means the combination of rocks 
and such structural features 
as fountains, pools, art 
ie 
works, screens, walls, fences, 
or hedges, but such objects 
alone, in the absence of 
planted trees, shrubs, ground 
cover, flowers, or lawns, 
shall not meet the 
requirements of this code. 
(51) "Land use plan" means a 
plan adopted and maintained by 
the planning commission which 
shows how the land should be 
used. The land use plan is an 
element of the comprehensive 
or General plan. 
(52) "Large Lot Planned 
Subdivision" means a 
subdivision which conforms to 
the requirements of Section 
16.04.400 ££, seq. and 
16.04.500 ££ seq, 
(53) "Live waterway" means a 
stream channel in which water 
runs more or less continually 
for a period of ten days or 
more during any one calendar 
year, including a river, 
creek, irrigation canal and 
irrigation ditch, but not 
including a channel that is 
dry except during rainstorms. 
(54) "Livestock corral" means 
a place or pen where livestock 
are kept as part of an 
agricultural or livestock 
operation as distinguished 
from a livestock feed lot. 
(55) "Livestock feed lot" 
means a feeding operation on a 
parcel of land where livestock 
are conditioned for market on 
a year-round basis and where 
the feed is brought to the 
yard, as contrasted to feed 
9q 
obtained through grazing the 
animals on the premises. 
(56) "Lodging house" means a 
building containing sleeping 
apartments that are rented to 
guests on a weekly cr monthly 
basis. 
(57) "Lot" or •zoning lot" 
means a parcel of property 
complying with all applicable 
standards of the zone in which 
it is situated and otherwise 
fully complying with all other 
requirements for the issuance 
of a building permit with 
respect thereto. Where the 
context so requires, the term 
lot shall also include parcels 
of ground in a large scale 
development or a planned small 
subdivision, which parcels 
have been approved by the 
County for individual 
disposition to purchasers, and 
condominium units in such a 
large scale development, but 
only if such units are defined 
as, or include, a parcel of 
ground similar to other types 
of lots. 
(58) "Master plan*" means a 
plan prepared by the County in 
conformance with Utah Code § 
17-27-301 or such other 
similar statute. 
(59) "Mobile home" means a 
vehicular or portable 
structure which is constructed 
for movement on the public 
highways and designed for use 
as a residence, but which has 
not been demonstrated to 
conform to the requirements o 
the uniform building code. 
(60) "Mobile home park" means 
an area or tract of land used 
to accommodate two or more 
mobile homes. 
(61) "Nonconforming building" 
means a building, structure, 
or portion thereof which does 
not conform to the regulation, 
of this code but which legall1 
existed prior to the effective 
date of this code. 
(62) "Nonconforming lot of 
record" means a parcel of Ian 
which does not conform to the 
area, frontage, access, or 
width requirements of this 
code, but which was shown on 
the records of the County 
recorder, and legally existed 
as an independent parcel or 
two contiguous parcels prior 
to the effective date of this 
code and which satisfies one 
of the following additional 
requirements: 
(a) The parcel would have 
qualified for a building 
permit prior to the effective 
date of this code; 
(b) The parcel did not qualif; 
for a building permit prior t< 
the effective date of this 
code for the sole reason that 
the parcel did not comply wit] 
che access or frontage 
requirements, prior to said 
date, and the parcel is now 
served by a travel easement o: 
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the type required for a 
building permit on a parcel of 
agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes. 
(63) "Nonconforming use" means 
a use of premises which does 
not conform to the regulations 
of this code, but which 
legally existed prior co the 
effective date of this code. 
(64) "Off-site" means 
pertaining to the territory 
outside the boundaries of a 
particular project. 
(65) "On-site" means 
pertaining to the territory 
within the boundaries of a 
particular project. 
(66) "Open space" means land 
which is not covered by 
dwellings or other buildings, 
or by pavement or other 
impervious material which has 
common ownership and is 
dedicated to be used 
perpetually by the owners or 
the public for some other 
purpose besides development. 
(67) "Open space preservation 
agreement" means an agreement, 
in a form approved by the 
County, between the County, 
the owner, and the developer 
in which the owner and the 
developer each agrees for 
himself, his successors and 
assigns to preserve certain 
land as open space for the 
life of a development. 
(68) "Owner" means, for the 
purposes of Title 16 only, the 
person who is the owner of 
record in the office of the 
County Recorder of the fee 
interest in a cract of land 
proposed for development as a 
large scale development. Owner 
shall include a mortgagee or 
beneficiary under a mortgage 
or deed of trust encumbering 
the proposed common area in 
the tract when used to 
identify those persons who are 
to execute the open space 
preservation agreement and the 
warranty deed conveying such 
common area to the Property 
Owners Association. 
(69) "Parking space" means a 
space not less than 20 feet in 
length and not less than 8•5 
feet in width for the parking 
of a mobile vehicle, exclusive 
of driveways and ramps. 
(70) "Pasture" means an 
enclosure for animals in which 
no feed is provided except 
that which the animals obtain 
by grazing. 
CZ1) "Planned recreation 
development" means a tract of 
land located in the RF-1 zone 
which conforms with the 
requirements of Section 16.04. 
et. seq-
(72) "Planning commission" 
means the Wasatch County 
Planning Commission. 
(73) "Planting plan" means a 
plan showing the location and 
dimensions of irrigation 
equipment and curbs and other 
protective features around the 
edge of the planting beds, and 
the location, dimensions, and 
species of plants to be 
planted. 
(74) "Preliminary plan" means 
a plan prepared in accordance 
with County standards showing 
the approximate layout and 
dimensions of lots, streets, 
easements, common areas and 
other features of a 
development in sufficient 
detail to give the reviewing 
authority a clear and accurate 
concept of the development and 
what it will contain when 
completed. 
(75) "Premises" means a lot 
together with the buildings 
and structures located 
thereon. 
(76) "Premises occupation" 
means an occupation conducted 
on any premises, except 
premises containing a vacation 
dwelling, by persons residing 
on those premises. 
(77) "Property Owners 
Association" or "Home Owners 
Association" means the 
association of lot owners of a 
project approved as a planned 
recreational development under 
Section 16.04.2000, or a 
planned unit development under 
Section 16.04.3000 for the 
benefit and use of the 
individual lot owners in such 
development. 
(78) "Public parks and 
1 
playgrounds" means a tract of 
land which is owned by the 
/ County and has been partially 
or totally developed or 
designated for recreational 
use by the public. 
(79) "Record of survey map" 
means a final plat that 
conforms to this code and 
constitutes a record of survey 
map as defined by the Utah 
Condominium Ownership Act. 
(80) "Rest home" means a 
building for the care and 
keeping of elderly or infirm 
people affected with 
infirmities or chronic 
illness. 
/ (81) "Retail drive-in" means 
any form of merchandising, 
serving, or dispensing of 
goods or services in which the 
customer is serviced while in 
his automobile. 
(82) "Rooming house" means 
lodging house. 
(83) "Salvage yard" means junk 
yard. 
(84) "Septic tank" means a 
tank in which the solid matter 
of continuously flowing sewage 
is disintegrated by bacteria. 
(85) "Septic tank drainfield" 
means a specified tract or 
J parcel of land in which the 
sewage that flows from a 
septic tank is oxidized. 
(86) "Setback" means the 
shortest distance between a 
specified line and the 
foundation, wall, or main 
I 
-10 
frame of a building. j 
(87) "Sign" means any device 
for visual communication that 
is used for the purpose of 
bringing the subject thereof 
to the attention of the 
public, but not including a 
flag pole which is used for j 
the display of the state or J 
national flag. j 
(a) "Accessory sign" means a j 
sign which directs attention 
to a business or profession 
conducted on the premises. j 
(b) "Area of sign" means the 
area of a sign shall be 
considered to include all 
lettering, working and 
accompanying designs or 
symbols, and any background 
material or free standing 
supports. Where a sign 
consists of individual letters 
or symbols attached to or 
painted on a building, wall, 
or window, the area of the 
sign shall be considered to be 
the area of the smallest 
rectangle which encompasses 
all such letters or symbols. 
(c) "Free-standing sign" means 
a sign which is not attached 
to or part of a building. 
(d) "Non-accessory11 or 
"billboard sign" means a sign 
which directs attention to a 
business, commodity, service 
or entertainment that is not, 
other than incidentally, 
conducted, sold, or offered 
such on the premises where the 
16 
sign is located. 
(88) "Sleeping apartment" 
means one or more rooms 
designed as a unit within a 
hotel, motel, boarding house, 
dormitory, bunkhouse or 
similar use providing sleeping 
accommodations for guests. 
Regardless of the structure of 
the building concerned, such a 
unit shall not be considered 
to consist of more than two 
bedrooms or two beds, 
whichever is less, within such 
building for the purpose of 
determining the number of 
sleeping apartments. 
(89) "Single1 Lot: subdivision" 
means a subdivision consisting 
of a single building lot which 
conforms with the requirements 
of Section 15.04.100 fit 2£2L-
(90) "Slope" means the ratio 
of the vertical distance moved 
to the horizontal distance 
moved, expressed in percentage 
or degrees, when traversing 
along the surface of land. 
(91) "Small-lot Planned 
Subdivision" means a 
subdivision which conforms 
with the requirements of 
Section 16.04.1000 fit seq. 
(92) "Small-scale subdivision" 
means a subdivision which 
conforms with the requirements 
of Section IS.04.300 fi£. seq. 
(93) "Special exception" means 
conditional use. 
(94) "Storm, 100 Year 24 Hour 
Incident" means a storm of the 
•11 
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magnitude which is probable to 
occur only once in 100 years. 
(95) "Story" means that 
portion of a building included 
between the surface of a floor 
and the ceiling next above it. 
(96) "Street" is defined as 
follows: 
(a) "Paved street" means a 
roadway which has been 
constructed in accordance with 
County standards, with respect 
to durability of the surface 
of the traveled part of the 
roadway, 
(b) "Major street" means a 
road which has been designated 
on the County master plan as a 
collector, arterial, or other 
principal thoroughfare as 
distinguished from a minor 
street. 
(c) "Minor street" means any 
dedicated street serving as 
the principal means of access 
to property, which street is 
not shown on the County master 
plan as a principal 
thoroughfare. 
(d) "Private street" means a 
roadway which is rused for 
vehicular travel1to two or 
more dwellings, but does not 
have the status of a public 
street. 
(e) ^Public street" means a 
roadway which has been 
designated as a federal or 
state highway or which has 
been designated as a County 
street on the official County 
1 
road map adopted by resolution 
of the Councy commission. 
(97) "Subdivision" means a 
tract, lot or parcel of land 
which has been divided into 
two or more lots, plots, 
sites, or other division of 
land for the purpose, whether 
immediate or future, of sale 
or of building development; 
provided that: this definition 
shall not include a bona fide 
division or partition of 
agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes or of 
commercial, manufacturing or 
industrial land for 
commercial, manufacturing, or 
industrial purposes. 
(98) "Supplemental 
environmental study" means a 
document requested by the 
Planning or County Commission 
pursuant to this Title 
providing additional 
information regarding the 
impact that a proposed 
development will have on the 
natural features of the 
immediate area, and the social 
and financial impact which the 
proposed development will have 
on the County as a whole. 
(99) "Unnecessary hardship" 
means a general restriction 
placed upon a parcel with 
respect to area, width, or 
setback where, by reason of 
exceptional narrowness, 
shallowness, shape or 
topography of such parcel, a 
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literal enforcement of the I 
general restriction would 
result in an unfairness to the 
owner of the parcel when 
compared to the owners of lots 
in the same zone and where 
literal enforcement would be 
unnecessary in order to 
achieve the intent of the 
zone . 
(100) "Vacation home" means 
vacation dwelling defined in 
Subsection (22)(h). 
(101) "Vacation vehicle" means 
a vehicle used or maintained 
primarily as a temporary 
dwelling for travel, vacation, 
or recreation purposes. 
(102) "Vacation vehicle court" 
means an area or tract of land 
used to accommodate two or 
more vacation vehicles or 
camper units for a period of 
less than 30 days. 
(103) "Variance" means a 
waiver of an area, width, or 
setback requirement, as 
distinguished from a special 
exception. 
(104) "Waste disposal site" 
means a tract of land devoted 
to the disposal of solid 
wastes, including garbage, 
rubbish, trash and other 
refuse material, but not earth 
or other totally inert 
materials. 
(105) "Yard" means the space 
on a lot with a dwelling, 
unoccupied or unobstructed 
except by landscaping from the 
16-
ground upward. 
(a) "Front yard" means the 
yard between the street 
right-of-way line and the 
front line of a dwelling, 
exclusive of non-enclosed 
steps, and extending the 
entire width of the lot. On a 
corner lot, the front yard may 
be applied to either street. 
(b) "Rear yard" means the yard 
between the rear line of a 
dwelling, exclusive of all 
steps, and the rear lot line 
and extending for the entire 
width of the lot. In the case 
of a c o m e r lot where the 
dwelling facade faces on the 
side street, the rear yard may 
be established from the side 
of .the house to the side 
property line. 
(c) "Required yard" means the 
yard around dwellings required 
by the terms of this code. 
(d) "Side yard" means the yard 
between the side line of a 
dwelling and the side lot line 
and extending from the front 
yard to the rear yard. 
(106) "Youth group home" means 
a dwelling unit wherein room, 
board, ordinary care, and 
supervision are provided in a 
family environment by the 
resident family or group home 
parents to persons who are 
unrelated to the resident 
family or group home parents 
and who are under the age of 
18 years. To qualify, the 
3 
H *> 
dwelling unit must be approved 
by the Jtah State Department: 
of Social Services, 
16.01-020. Violations• 
Unless otherwise specified 
herein, any person violating 
the provisions of Title 16 
shall be deemed guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91, 
16.01.020) 
16.01.03 0. Zones Established. 
In order to carry out the 
purposes of this title, the 
unincorporated area of Wasatch 
County, Utah, is hereby 
divided into zones as follows: 
(1) A-l Agricultural Zone 
(2) G-l Grazing Zone 
(3) W.C.-l Watershed Conservation 
Zone 
(4) RA Residential Agricultural Zone 
(5) RF-1 Recreation Forestry Zone 
(6) T&S-l Trades and Services Zone 
(7) C-l Commercial Zone I 
(8) C-2 Commercial Zone II 
(9) 1-1 Industrial Zone 
(10) 1-2 Industrial Zone 
(11) FPO-1 Flood Plain Overlay. Zone 
(12) A-l Airport Overlay Zone 
(13) FP Foothill Preservation Zone 
(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91, 
16.01.030) ; 
16.01.040. Official Zone Map. 
The location and boundaries of 
each of the zones are shown on 
the Official Zone Map of 
Wasatch County, Utah, and the 
map is hereby declared to be an 
official record and a part of 
this Code. The Official Zone 
1 
Map and all notations, 
reference and other information 
shown thereon shall be as much 
a part of this code as if the 
matters and other information 
set forth by the map were fully 
described in this title. The 
Official Zone Map shall be 
identified by the signature of 
the chairman of the County 
Commission, attested no by the 
County Clerk and recorded in 
the office of the County 
Recorder. Whenever amendments 
or changes are made in zone 
boundaries, such amendments or 
changes shall be made promptly 
by the Zoning Administrator on 
the Official Zone Map. No 
amendment or change shall 
become effective until after it 
has been properly noted and 
attested to on the Official 
Zone Map. 
(Ord. No. 63, Renumbered, 10/01/91, 
16.01.040) 
16.01.050. Boundaries of 
Zones• 
Where uncertainty exists with 
respect to the boundaries of 
various zones, the following 
rules shall apply: 
(1) Where the indicated 
boundaries on the Official Zone 
Map are approximately street or 
alley lines, the streets or 
alleys shall be construed to be 
the zone boundaries. 
(2) Where the indicated 
boundaries are approximately 
-14 
lot lines, the lot lines shall 
be construed to be the zone 
boundaries. 
(3) Where indicated boundaries 
are canals or rivers, the 
centerline of the canals or 
rivers shall be construed as 
the zone boundaries. 
(4) Where land has not been 
subdivided into lots, the zone 
boundaries shall be determined 
by the use of the scale of 
measurement shown on the 
Official Zone Map, 
(5) Where other uncertainty 
exists, the Board of Adjustment 
shall interpret the Official 
Zone Map. 
(Ord. No- S3, Renumbered, 10/01/91, 
16.01.050) 
Chapter 1 6 . 0 2 . General 
D e v e l o p m e n t S t a n d a r d s 
Applicable to Al l Zones. 
16.02.010. Intent . 
16.02.020. Yard Space for_ One 
Building Only. 
16.02.030.Sale or Lease of 
Required Space Prohibited. 
16.02.040. Every Dwelling to be 
on a Zoning Lot. 
16.02.050. Area of Accessory 
Buildings. 
16.02.060. Accessory Building 
Prohibited as Living Quarters. 
16.02.070. Storage of Junk and 
Debris Prohibited. 
16.02.080. Yards to be 
Unobstructed - Exceptions, 
16.02.090. Additional Setbacks 
For Buildings Required. 
16.02.100. Exception to Front 
and Side Setback Requirements. 
16.02.110. Setbacks from 
Highways. 
16.02.120. Dwelling Sites to be 
Accessible by a Public Street. 
16.02.130. Effect: of Street 
Plan. 
16.01 140, Additional Height 
Allowed for Public Buildings. 
16.02.150. Minimum Height of 
Dwellings. 
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 5 0 . L o c a t i o n of B a m s . 
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 7 0 . F e n c e s and W a l l s . 
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 8 0 . D r a i n a g e . 
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 9 0 . Bond. 
1 6 . 0 2 . 2 0 0 . P o l l u t i o n 
Prevention. 
16.02.210. Concessions in 
Public Parks and Playgrounds. 
16.02.220. Extraction of Earth 
Products. 
16.02.230. Watershed Pollution 
Prevention. 
16.02.240. Solid Waste Disposal 
Sites. 
16.02.250. Utility Buildings 
and Structures Permitted in 
Residential Agricultural Zone. 
16.02.260. Exposed Slopes to be 
Less than the Critical Angle of 
Repose. 
16.02.270. Fractional Numbers. 
15,02.230. Agricultural Lands 
for Agricultural Purposes. 
16.02.290 Off-Street Parking 
Standards. 
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be owned by the same person or 
corporation which owns or 
controls the operation of the 
airport, or else an easement 
covering the land must be 
owned by the same person or 
corporation which will prevent 
the construction of buildings 
and structures or the growing 
of trees or other natural 
feature over the above 
prescribed height limits. 
(4) Use Restrictions, 
Notwithstanding any other -" 
provision of this title, no 
uses may be made of land 
within the County which will 
create electrical interference 
with radio communication 
between airports and aircraft; 
make it difficult for flyers 
to distinguish between airport 
lights and others; result in 
glare in the eyes of flyers 
using the airport; impair 
visibility in the vicinity of 
airports or otherwise endanger 
the landing or taking off of 
aircraft. 
(Ord. No. 62 , Renumbered, 1 0 / 0 1 / 9 1 , 
1 6 . 0 2 . 1 4 0 ; Ord. No. 66, Renumbered, 
1 0 / 0 1 / 9 1 , 1 6 . 0 3 . 1 4 0 ) 
16.03.160". PP F p o t h i l l 
Preservat ion Zone 
(RESERVED). 
Chapter 16.04 R e s i d e n t i a l 
Development in Zones-
16 .04 .010 . R e s i d e n t i a l 
Developments a v a i l a b l e i n 
zones• 
Except for caretaker 
dwellings allowed pursuant to 
Section 16.04.280, and other 
Sections of this Title, the 
following are the only types 
of residential developments 
allowed: 
(a) Single Lot Subdivisions 
(Section 16.04.100)/ 
(b) Farm Preservation 
Subdivisions (Section 
16.04.200); 
(c) Small Scale Subdivisions 
(Section 16.04.300); 
(d) Large Lot Planned 
Subdivisions (Sections 
16.04.400 and 16.04.500); 
(e) Small Lot Planned 
Subdivisions (Sections 
16.04.1000); 
(f) Planned Residential 





16.04.020 . Specific 
Requirements. Specific 
requirements for each type of 
residential development are 
"Contained in this chapter. 
Building permits shall not be 
issued for dwelling units 
which would be in violation of 
this Title. 
16.04.030. Sale, 
Advertisement, or Offering for 
Sale of Lots in Unapproved 
Subdivisions Prohibited. 
Lot(s) in a subdivision that 
16-76 
has not received final 
approval according to the 
requirements contained in this 
Title may not be sold, 
advertised for sale, or" 
offered for sale in any 
manner. 
16.04.040. Minimum Lot Size. 
Except as specifically 
provided otherwise in this 
Title, the minimum lot size 
allowed for a dwelling unit in 
Wasatch County is one(l) acre. 
16.04.050. Water Required for 
Residential Development. 
(1) Each residential 
development proposed in 
Wasatch County must have safe 
and adequate culinary water 
ufficient to-meet the water 
*ieeds of the development 
according to State and local 
ordinance. It is the 
responsibility of the 
developer to conclusively 
establish the availability Q £ 
culinary water and its 
dedication to the proposed 
residential development prior 
to final approval. 
(2) Except for single lot 
subdivisions, farm 
preservation subdivisions, or 
small scale subdivisions any 
residential development 
containing lot(s) smaller than 
five(5) acres in size is 
required to connect each lot 
to a culinary water system if 
any of the property in the 
proposed development is 
located in a Special Service 
District organized for the 
purpose of supplying culinary 
water. 
(3) Except for single lot 
subdivi s i ons, f arm 
preservation subdivisions, or 
small scale subdivisions, any 
residential development 
containing lotts) smaller*" than 
2.5 acres in size is required 
to connect each lot in the 
residential development to a 
culinary water system. 
(4) Except for single lot 
subdivisions, farm 
preservation subdivisions, or 
small scale subdivisions, any 
residential development 
containing lot(s) smaller than 
2.5 acres in size is required 
to connect each lot in the 
residential development to a 
secondary water system for 
outside and/or livestock 
watering. 
(5) Any residential 
development required to 
connect to a culinary water 
system pursuant to this Title 
shall also be required to 
provide fire flow protection 
to each lot in the residential 
development as set forth in 
the applicable statute or 
ordinance. 
(6) Except for caretaker 
dwellings and lots in farm 
preservation subdivisions, and 
16-77 
